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Abstract
Freges thesis that second-level concepts can be correlated with rst-
level concepts and that the latter can be correlated with their value-ranges
is in direct conict with Cantors power-set theorem, which is a necessary
part of the iterative, but not of the logical, concept of class. Two consistent
second-order logics with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms
are described in which Freges thesis and the logical notion of a class
are defended and Cantors theorem is rejected. Cantors theorem is not
incompatible with the logical notion of class, however. Two alternative
similar kinds of logics are also described in which Cantors theorem and
the logical notion of a class are retained and Freges thesis is rejected.
1 Cantors Power-Set Theorem and the Logical
Concept of Class
It is taken as an obvious truism today that Cantors power-set theorem to-
gether with the assumption that there is a universal class implies Cantors para-
dox (cf. Quine 1963, 202). For, by denition of what it means for one class to
have a greater cardinal number of members than another, Cantors theorem that
any function (many-one relation) from a class into the class of all subclasses of
that class cannot be onto the latter  i.e., that at least one subclass of that
class is not in the range of the function  has the consequence that the cardinal
number of the class of all subclasses of a class is always greater than the cardi-
nal number of that class, and therefore that there can be no greatest cardinal
number. The universal class, however, contains every class, including the class
of all its subclasses, and therefore no class can have a greater cardinal number
of members than the universal class, i.e., the universal class has the greatest
cardinal number, from which it follows that there is a greatest cardinal number
after all.1
1For the sake of historical accuracy I should note that I. Grauan-Guiness informs me that
Cantors paradox is the claim that there is a greatest cardinal number that is both identical
with itself and greater than itself, and that the way Cantor arrived at this paradoxprobably
had nothing to do with his power-set theorem and indeed predates it. The version we give
here is the way Cantors paradox is usually understood today.
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The assumption that there is a universal class is an essential part of what is
known as the logical notion of a class, i.e., the notion of a class as the extension
of a concept. Cantors theorem, on the other hand, is an essential part of the
mathematical notion of a class, i.e., the notion of a class as a set, which is
also called the iterative concept of set (Boolos 1971). As based on the iterative
concept, classes as sets are formed in stages by iterating the operation: X !
X [ P(X), where P(X) is the power set of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of X,
which, by Cantors theorem, has a greater cardinal number of members than X
has. The stages in which classes as sets are formed in this way are assumed to
be well-ordered so that each stage corresponds to some ordinal number (up to,
at least, some limit ordinal, if the stages are assumed to terminate at all). It is
for this reason that this notion of class is said to be a mathematical, and not a
logical, notion.
The mathematical and the logical notions of a class can be combined, but
only by seriously restricting the logical notion so that not all classes in the logical
sense are sets (or have sets corresponding to them). Thus, given, as essential to
the iterative concept of set as based on Cantors theorem, the power-set axiom
that the class of all subsets of any set is itself a set, it follows by Cantors theorem
that the universal class is not a set.2 In such a combined framework, classes
that are not sets (or that do not have sets corresponding to them) are called
ultimate, or proper, classes, and, it is generally assumed, that while such
classes have members, they cannot themselves be members, whether of sets or
of ultimate classes. Thus, for example, although every set is a member of the
universal class in such a framework, the universal class cannot be a member of
itself, nor of any other class (not even its singleton, or other nite classes). It is
through such a restriction on classes in the logical sense that Cantors paradox
is avoided; for, in such a framework, Cantors theorem is assumed to apply only
to classes that are sets.
The restriction, if not total elimination, of classes in the logical sense is
usually said to be necessary not because of Cantors paradox but because of
Russells paradox. Russells paradox, however, as Russell himself made clear,
was based on Cantors theorem and the assumption that there is a universal
class. Thus, Russell claimed that he was led to his paradox in the endeavour
to reconcile Cantors proof that there can be no greatest cardinal number with
the very plausible supposition that the class of all terms (which we have seen
to be essential to all formal propositions) has necessarily the greatest possible
number of members(Russell 1903, 101). Russell then described the derivation
of his paradox through the construction of a certain many-one relation dened
2The argument, succinctly stated as follows, is easily seen to be valid:
The cardinal number of the class of all subsets of any set is greater than the
cardinal number of that set (Cantors theorem). The class of all subsets of any
set is itself a set (power-set axiom). The cardinal number of any set is not greater
than the cardinal number of any set containing that set (by denition of greater
cardinality). The universal class (by denition) contains every class. Therefore,
the universal class is not a set.
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over the universal class as follows (p. 367):
In the case of terms and classes, if x be not a class, let us correlate
it with x, i.e., the class whose only member is x, but if x be a class,
let us correlate it with itself. (This is not a one-one, but a many-one
correlation, for x and x are both correlated with x . . .) Then
the class which, according to Cantors argument, should be omitted
from the correlation, is the class w of those classes which are not
members of themselves; yet this, being a class, should be correlated
with itself.
Here we have a clear application of Cantors theorem that any many-one
relation from a class into the. class of all subclasses of that class cannot be
onto the latter, i.e., that at least one subclass of that class is not in the range
of that relation. As applied to the universal class and the many-one relation
in question, the subclass that must be omitted is the class of those classes that
are not members of themselves, which, as Russell observed, stands to itself in
the relation in question (namely, the identity relation as applied to classes) and
therefore is in the range of the relation after all. Thus Russells paradox is but
another variation of the conict between Cantors theorem and the assumption
that there is a universal class.
It does not follow that it is the logical notion of a class, and in particular the
assumption that there is a universal class, that must be given up as a result of
this conict with Cantors theorem. Russell himself, in fact, after discovering his
paradox, was by no means ready to give up the logical notion. Thus, although
he agreed that one would be tempted to say that the conception of the totality
of things, or of the whole universe of entities and existents, is in some way
illegitimate and inherently contrary to logic,nevertheless, he went on to insist
that it is undesirable to adopt so desperate a measure as long as hope remains
of some less heroic solution(1903, 362).
Unfortunately, the less heroic solution that Russell adopted in the end,
namely, a theory of logical types, is not really philosophically satisfying. For,
although the logical notion of a class is retained in such a framework, it is
retained, as it were, with a vengeance. In particular, rather than there being
just one universal class, there is instead a universal class for each logical type.
The logical notion of a class is preserved on this approach, but only at the
expense of having it relativised to each of the di¤erent logical types.
Of course, strictly speaking, there are no classes in Russells theory of types,
because for him all talk of classes was reducible to talk of concepts, or what he
called propositional functions, as higher-order intensional objects. This is not an
objection that we will be concerned with here. For the fact that all talk of classes
in the logical sense can be reduced and explained in terms of intensional objects
does not mean that the logical notion of a class is being rejected or eliminated.
That is, the logical notion of a class is just the notion of a class as the extension
of a concept, which, as Frege pointed out, is another way of saying that classes
in the logical sense have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are
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and not in their members (cf. Frege 1979, 183). We should not be surprised,
accordingly, if this notion is somehow reducible, or otherwise explainable, in
terns of other more fundamental notions having to do with concepts. For that
reason we will not be concerned here with the question of whether the notion of
a class in the logical sense is being taken as a primitive or not, i.e., with whether
classes and membership are taken as primitives of a logical framework or are
analyzed instead in terms of concepts and predication.
There. is another problem with Russells solution, however, in addition to
that of the relativisation of classes to each logical type. This problem has to
do with the fact that the particular theory of types that Russell adopted is a
theory of ramied types, which, unlike the theory of simple types, is based on a
constructive (i.e., predicative) comprehension principle. Such a constructive
approach is not without merit, but it does a¤ect the logical notion of a class in a
fundamental way. In particular, because of the kind of constructive constraints
imposed by the theory on the comprehension principle, Cantors theorem, which
involves objects of di¤erent types, cannot be proved in such a framework (cf.
Quine 1963. 265). That is not objectionable in itself, but it does not get at the
root of the matter of the real conict between Cantors power-set theorem and
the logical notion of class as represented by an impredicative comprehension
principle.
An impredicative comprehension principle is provable in the theory of simple
types. But in this framework, as in the theory of ramied types as well, Russells
paradox cannot even be stated (because of the grammatical constraints on the
conditions of well-formedness), which means that the description of the class
upon which Russells paradox is based is meaningless. Thus, not only must the
universal class be relativised and duplicated, potentially, innitely many times
in order to avoid Russells paradox on this approach, but the paradox must itself
be ruled as meaningless. The theory of types, whether simple or ramied, is not
really a solution of the problem so much as a way of avoiding it altogether.
There is another way in which we can preserve our logical intuitions and
not give up the logical notion of a class in favor of the mathematical (i.e., in
favor of set theory), and yet in which not only is Cantors theorem formulable
but so is Russells paradox (though, of course, the latter will no longer be
provable). Indeed, there is not just one such way, but at least two (both of
which themselves have two alternatives). On the rst, it is not the logical notion
of a class that must be rejected as the way of resolving Russells paradox, but
Cantors theorem instead. This rejection is not ad hoc or arbitrary on this
approach, but is based on a more general principle, which we refer to as Freges
double-correlation thesis. It is this approach that we will turn to rst. On the
second and alternative approach, which we will turn to later, the trouble lies in
neither Cantors theorem nor in the assumption that there is a universal class
(both of which can be retained without contradiction on this approach), but
rather in how the logic of identity is to be applied in certain contexts. On this
approach, the claim that a contradiction results by combining Cantors theorem
with the assumption that the universal class exists is not a truismafter all
but is outright false.
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2 Second-order Logic with Nominalized Predi-
cates as Abstract Singular Terms
Frege was the rst to give not only a complete formulation of rst-order logic but
a formulation of standard second-order logic as well, and it was in the context
of the latter that he attempted to present the logical notion of a class (or what
he called a Wertverlauf ). Unfortunately, it was that presentation that fell to
Russells paradox. In writing Frege of his paradox, Russell described it not only
in terms of the class of those classes that are not members of themselves but also
in terms of predication (where by a predicate Russell meant a monadic concept):
Let w be the predicate of being predicate which cannot be predicated of itself.
Can w be predicated of itself? From either answer follows its contradictory
(Frege 1980, 130). Frege objected to the idea of a concept (or predicate in
Russells terminology) being predicated of (or falling under) itself, and preferred
to speak instead of a concept being predicated of its own extension (p. 132f).
On his view, concepts have an unsaturated nature, which he explained in terms
of their functionality, and it was this unsaturated nature that precluded their
being objects or, from a semantical point of view, entities that can be denoted
by singular terms. Thus concepts, because they are not objects, cannot be
the objects denoted by nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms 
contrary to what Russell assumed in speaking of the predicate [concept] of
being a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself.
This di¤erence, though fundamental, is not crucial to the way that Russells
paradox applies to Freges logic. For, even though a nominalized predicate can-
not, according to Frege, denote the concept that the predicate otherwise stands
for in its role as a predicate, he did agree that it denotes a logical object some-
how correlated with that concept, namely, the class (Wertverlauf ) that is the
extension of that concept. It is only in this way, Frege maintained, that we
are able to apprehend classes as logical objects at all.3 Thus, Freges logic of
classes is really an extension of standard second-order logic in which nominalized
predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms on a par with indi-
vidual variables and other singular terms, and in particular as singular terms
that denote classes (or, more generally, Wertverläufe). It is this sort logical
framework  but not necessarily with Freges view of concepts and the nature
of their unsaturatedness  that we will adopt in developing our two approaches
toward defending the notion of a class in the logical sense. Instead of Freges
particular view of concepts as functions from objects to truth-values, there is an
alternative (which in fact we prefer) in which concepts are viewed as cognitive
3Cf. Cocchiarella 1987, chapter 2, section 4. for a detailed justication of the claim that for
Frege the objects denoted by nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms are none other
than the classes (Wertverläufe) that are the extensions of the concepts that those predicates
stand for. In regard to Freges view of classes as logical objects and our apprehension of
them as such. compare Freges July 1902 letter to Russell: But the question is. how de we
apprehend logical objects? And I have found no other answer to it than this. We apprehend
them as extensions of concepts, or more generally, as ranges of values of functions (Frege
1980, I41).
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structures, the unsaturated nature of which is explained in terms of their role
as capacities that are exercised in speech acts (and as what informs those acts
with predicative content).4 We will leave open the question of which particular
view to adopt and simply consider the general framework to be Fregean-like.
Frege did not allow nominalized predicates to occur as such in his extended
second-order logic, but used instead the spiritus lenis as an abstraction operator
corresponding to the operation of nominalization. That is, instead of allowing
F (F ) as well-formed, where F ( ) is a monadic predicate and F (without paren-
theses) is its nominalization. Frege used F (xF (x)), with xF (x) as the way
to represent the nominalization of F ( ). We will not represent the operation
of nominalization that way here, however, but will simply take the deletion of
parentheses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate) as our way of
distinguishing (in the object language) the nominalization of a predicate from
the predicate itself.
An abstraction operator is useful in the representation of complex predi-
cates, however, and, in conformity with current practice, we will use Churchs
-operator for that purpose. Thus, where '(x1; :::; xn) is a w¤ (well-formed for-
mula), [x1:::xn'(x1; :::; xn)](:) is a complex (n-place) predicate, and [x1:::xn
'(x1; :::; xn)] is a complex singular term. (For convenience, we will usually drop
the accompanying pair of parentheses in referring to predicates as unsaturated
expressions, though whenever a predicate occurs in a w¤ as a predicate it will
always have its accompanying pair of parentheses).
Aside from logical grammar (for the formal details of which see Appendix
A), we assume the general framework of standard second-order predicate logic
with identity, but extended now to apply to w¤s in which nominalized predicates
occur as abstract singular terms. The logical laws that apply to -abstracts as
complex predicates in this context are (1) -conversion (starred to mark the
fact that it also applies to w¤s that contain nominalized predicates),
[x1:::xn'](a1; :::; an) ! '(a1=x1; :::; an=xn); (-Conv*)
where, for 1  i  n, ai is free for xi in '; and (2) the identity law,
[x1:::xnF (x1; :::; xn)] = F (Id)
where F is an n-place predicate variable or constant. The (impredicative) com-
prehension principle of standard second-order predicate logic is also assumed,
and, at least initially, we will assume that it is also extended without qualica-
tion to apply to w¤s that contain nominalized predicates as well (and we use
*to mark this fact):
9Fn8x1:::8xn(F (x1; :::; xn) ! ') (CP*)
4The general framework in which predicates are assumed to stand for concepts as unsatu-
rated cognitive structures is called conceptualism, a formal account of which can be found in
Cocchiarella 1986. A form of conceptualism in which normalized predicates are assumed to
denote abstract objects is called conceptual realism, an account of which, with applications,
can be found in Cocchiarella 1989.
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where x1; :::; xn are distinct individual variables and Fn is an n-place predicate
variable that does not occur free in '. (We drop the superscript on predicates
when their degree is clear from the context in which they occur.) With -
abstracts, nominalized predicates, and Leibnizs law, (LL*), applied to the latter
as well,5 this principle is a consequence of the following simpler and more direct
version of comprehension (subject to the same conditions):
9Fn(F = [x1:::xn']): (CP)
As expressed in our present logical grammar, Freges basic law (Vb), namely,
[x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ]! 8x1:::8xn(' !  ); (Vb)
is now an immediate consequence of (LL*) and (-Conv*). It is this law that
Frege himself blamed for Russells paradox (see Frege 1964, I32), but we will
have no quarrel with it here. Freges basic law (Va) amounts to the following
principle of extensionality,
8x1:::8xn(' !  )! [x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ]: (Ext*)
This principle makes explicit Freges view that what nominalized predicates
denote are the extensions of the concepts that those predicates stand for. We
have no quarrel with this principle as well, but we will leave open the question of
its validity and allow that nominalized predicates may denote intensional objects
(the way they are normally understood in natural language). How exactly all
talk of classes as the extensions of concepts is to be explained in terms of such
intensional objects we will not go into here. For our purposes it will su¢ ce to
refer to the objects that nominalized predicates denote  whether those objects
be extensions or intensions  simply as concept-correlates. The assumption
that every (n-ary) concept has a correlate (be that correlate the extension or
intension of the concept), i.e., that (as abstract singular terms) nominalized
predicates denote values of the bound individual variables, amounts to a form
of conceptual Platonism. Formally, this assumption is stated simply as
8Fn9x(x = F ): (Plato*)
5By (LL*) we understand the principle (a = b) ! ('  !  ), where a; b are singular
terms, '; are w¤s (well-formed formulas), and  comes from ' by replacing one or more
free occurrences of b by free occurrences of a. If a cannot be properly substituted for b in
' (whether because of a clash of variables or because the result is not well-formed), then we
understand  to be just ' itself. In particular, where n 6= k, a1; :::; an are singular terms
(including nominalized predicates), and Gk is a k-place predicate expression, Gk(a1; :::; an)
is not well-formed  in which case (LL*) cannot validate (Fn = Gk)! (Fn(a1; :::; an) !
Gk(a1; :::; an)), because the latter is then also not well-formed. In those cases of (LL*) in
which a and b are nominalized predicates of di¤erent degree (number of argument positions),
(1) either  is the result of replacing only free subject-position occurrences of b in ' by free
subject-position occurrences of a, or (2) the replacement of b by a is not proper and (LL*)
reduces to the tautologous w¤ (a = b) ! ('  ! '). It is only when n = k that, e.g.. free
predicate positions of Gk in ' can be replaced by free predicate positions of Fn.
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In regard to the representation of Cantors theorem in this context, let us
adopt the following abbreviatory notation:
R is many-one =df 8x8y8z[R(x; y) ^R(x; z)! y = z);
and
G v F =df 8x[F (x)! G(x)]:
Stated now in terms of concepts and their correlates (that may in fact be the
extensions of those concepts), Cantors theorem that any many-one relation R
from a concept F into the concepts subordinate to F (or from a class into the
subclasses of that class) cannot be onto the latter can be formulated as follows:
8R(R is many-one ! 8F (8x8G[R(x;G)! (CT)
(F (x)  ! G v F ]! 9G[G v F ^ :9xR(x;G)])):
Although the statement of (CT) is relatively straightforward, we will deal in
what follows with an equivalent, but somewhat simpler, thesis, which maintains
only that the correlate of some concept contained in the domain of a many-one
relation is not in the range of that relation:
8R(R is many-one! 9F (8x[F (x)! 9yR(x; y)] ^ :9xR(x; F ))): (CT2)
That is, because the validity or invalidity of (CT) is equivalent to the validity
or invalidity of (CT2)), we will for convenience consider only the simpler version
here.
We observe rst that (CT2) has an obvious counter-instance. For, by (CP),
identity stands for a relation, i.e.,
9R(R = [xy(x = y)]):
which means that (CT2) can be instantiated to this relation. But then, because
the identity relation is many-one, it follows from (CT2) that some concept has a
correlate that is identical with nothing, i.e., that some concept has no correlate,
contrary to what is maintained by (Plato*).
On the other hand, (CT2) is also provable on the basis of (CP). For, where
R stands for any relation,
9F (F = [x9G(R(x;G) ^ :G(x))])
is validated by (CP). If, in addition, the relation R stands for is many-one, then
the correlate of the concept specied in this instance of (CP) cannot be in the
range of that relation; for, if R(x; F ) holds, where F stands for the concept spec-
ied above, then :F (x) must also hold  because F (x) implies 9G[R(x;G) ^
:G(x)], which (because the relation R stands for is many-one) implies :F (x)
 and therefore :9G[R(x;G)^:G(x)] also holds, which is impossible, because
:F (x) and the reductio hypothesis R(x; F ) imply 9G[R(x;G) ^ :G(x)].
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The upshot is that (CT2)  and therefore (CT) as well  is both validated
and refuted in the framework in question, which means that the framework is
inconsistent. Indeed, if we take the relation involved in the refutation of (CT2),
i.e., the identity relation, and put it in place of the many-one relation involved
in the proof of (CT2), the result is the concept specied in Russells paradox,
i.e., the concept of being the correlate of a concept that does not fall under
that concept: [x9G(R(x;G)^:G(x))]. Thus, by (CP), we have the following
instance of (CP*),
9F8x(F (x) ! 9G[x = G ^ :G(x)]);
from which, by (Plato*), it follows that the correlate of the concept in question
falls under that concept if, and only if, it is the correlate of a concept under
which it does not fall, which is impossible. As is clear from our earlier quote
of Russells Principles, it was in just this way, i.e., through Cantors power-set
theorem, that Russell arrived at his paradox.
3 Freges Double-Correlation Thesis
The two principles that are at the heart of the above contradiction are (CP)
and (Plato*), and an appropriate restriction of either, it turns out, will su¢ ce
to avoid the contradiction.6 We need not reject the logical intuitions that are
represented by the preceding Fregean-like framework, in other words, and in
particular we need not reject the logical notion of a class that is implicit in those
intuitions in order to overcome Russells paradox. What we need instead is a
principled way by which to restrict either (CP) or (Plato*) without nullifying
the logical intuitions of the overall framework. One such a principled way is
given by Freges double-correlation thesis.
In Freges original framework, besides the objects that singular terms denote
and the concepts that predicates stand for, there are also concepts that rst-
order quantier phrases stand for. These are called second-level concepts, as
opposed to the rst-level concepts that predicates stand for. Any formula with
free predicate variables that can be used in the comprehension principle for such
a quantier phrase stands in e¤ect for a second-level concept  the way, for
example, 8x[F (x)! G(x)] stands for the second-level relation of subordination
between rst-level concepts. Predicate quantier phrases, and formulas that can
be used to specify such a phrase, then stand for third-level concepts.7 Given
variables and quantiers for second-level concepts, we can go on in this way to
describe fourth-level concepts, and then, in a similar way, fth-level concepts,
and so on through a potentially innite hierarchy of concepts.
6The principle of -conversion, (-Conv*), is also involved, but even the modied version,
(9=-Conv*), that we will consider later as a consequence of the modication of (Plato*) is
applicable in the derivation of the contradiction. That is why we say that the real conict is
between (CP) and (Plato*).
7See Frege 1964, §23, for some of Freges examples of what he means by second- and
third-level concepts.
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What is important about this hierarchy and the way it is represented is
how it di¤ers from the hierarchy of simple types contained in Russells rami-
ed theory (despite the fact that Russells initial insight into the formulation
of his type theory was through Freges hierarchy8). Second- and higher-level
concepts, as indicated, correspond not to predicates the way that rst-level con-
cepts do, but to variable-binding operators that apply to w¤s and result in w¤s
when so applied (such as the existential or universal quantiers when a¢ xed
to variables). Thus, unlike predicates, operators or the type in question can be
commuted and iterated and can occur within the scope of one another without
regard to the levels of the concepts being represented. That is, unlike the hi-
erarchy determined by the iterative concept of set, where the higher levels are
completely determined by the lower, this hierarchy is not formed in accordance
with Cantors theorem. Rather, as indicated by the way that quantier phrases
can be commuted and occur within the scope of one another, higher-level con-
cepts are involved in the specication of lower-level concepts no less so than
lower-level concepts are involved in the specication of higher-level concepts.
The interplay between these levels is so intimate, moreover, that, according to
Frege, higher-level concepts can be represented in a way by lower-level concepts
 so long as the lowest level of concepts can be represented by the objects that
are their correlates, i.e., by their extensions (which, for us, could be their in-
tensions instead). All higher-level concepts, in other words, can be represented
by rst-level concepts, which in turn, at least for Frege, can be represented by
their extensions. That is why Frege  following natural language in this regard,
we might add  saw no point in explicitly introducing notation for quantifying
over second- and higher-level concepts.
The representation of higher-level concepts in terms of rst-level concepts,
and rst-level concepts in terms of their extensions (or intensions), i.e., the
objects that are their correlates, is most clearly seen in Freges double-correlation
thesis, according to which second-level concepts can be represented in a certain
mannerby rst-level concepts whereby the concepts that appear as arguments
of the former are represented by their value-ranges, i.e., by their concept -
correlates (which, as already noted, may be intensions rather than extensions).9
Expressed symbolically (in the monadic case) in terms of quantiers that range
8For a defense of this claim see Cocchiarella 1987. ch. 2. In addition to the constructive
nature of Russells ramied hierarchy, one important reason for the di¤erence of Russells
hierarchy from Freges was the rejection by Russell of the unsaturated nature of concepts.
This led Russell to represent higher-level concepts by di¤erent types of predicate expressions
(having di¤erent types of classes as their extensions), as opposed to Freges representation
in terms of di¤erent types of variable-binding operators (none of which have classes as their
extensions).
9See Frege 1964, §25.
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over second-level (monadic) concepts, this thesis can be formulated as follows:10
8Q9F8G[QxG(x) ! F (G)]; (Dbl*)
Thus, for example, corresponding to the second-level concept of objectual exis-
tence, i.e., the second-level concept that rst-order existential quantier phrases
stand for, there is a rst-level concept of being realized such that for any rst-
level concept G, there exists an object that is G if, and only if, the (object
correlated with the) concept G is realized.11
Now just as second-level concepts can be moved down a level(as Frege ex-
pressed it  see, e.g., 1979, 182), so too third-level concepts can be moved down
a level by being correlated with second-level concepts, and fourth-level concepts
can be moved down a level by being correlated with third-level concepts, and
so on through the whole hierarchy of concepts. In this way Freges entire hier-
archy of concepts can be compressed and telescoped downward into the totality
of rst-level concepts, which in turn can be represented by their extensions (or
intensions, if we drop Freges assumption of extensionality). Thus, there are no
more higher-level concepts in this framework than there are rst-level concepts,
just as there are no more rst-level concepts than there are objects, a situation
that is in direct conict with Cantors theorem.
Freges double-correlation thesis represents a picture of the hierarchy of con-
cepts that is di¤erent from the sort of hierarchy that is implicit in Cantors
theorem (and that is most clearly represented by the iterative concept of set).
If such a picture is really coherent and can be given a consistent formulation,
then it can be used to explain why we do not have to abandon our logical
intuitions regarding classes as the extensions of concepts, i.e., our intuitions re-
garding the notion of a class in the logical sense, as well as why we do not have
to accept Cantors theorem. As it turns out, the picture is not only coherent
but can be consistently described in two mutually supportive ways within stan-
dard second-order logic extended to include a logic of nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms.
10Frege stated this thesis for all second-level functions, not just for concept, i.e., those
functions that have truth-values as their values. We ignore functions other than concepts
here. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that Freges basic law V, namely:
xF (x) = xG(x)! 8x[F (x) ! G(x)]
is really a special case of the double-correlation thesis. For what is represented on the right-
hand side of this law is the second-level relation of mutual subordination between rst-level
concepts, which, given Freges extensional view of concepts (as functions from objects to truth-
values), amounts to the identityof their concept-correlates, i.e. of their value-ranges, which
is what is represented on the left-hand side.
11See 0n Concept and Object, in Frege 1952, 49, where the correspondence is so tight that
even the same thought is expressed by, e.g., there is a square root of 4 and the concept
square root of 4 is realized.
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4 Homogeneous Stratication and the System
HST*
Freges double-correlation thesis, in its generalized form, amounts to a corre-
lation rst of all higher-level concepts with rst-level concepts, and then to a
correlation of all rst-level concepts with objects, namely, their extensions or
intensions, depending on whether or not we assume (Ext*), the principle of ex-
tensionality. The two mutually supportive ways of consistently formulating the
picture this hierarchy presents is given by slightly modifying either of these two
correlations. The rst such way has to do with how rst-level concepts, i.e., the
concepts that predicates stand for, are specied in a standard second-order logic
that has been extended to include a logic of nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms. That is, the rst way has to do with a revision, or modication,
of the comprehension principle, (CP).
In starting with standard second-order logic, we assume that every instance
of the comprehension principle, (CP), that contains a -abstract of standard
second-order logic without nominalized predicates is in itself unproblematic and
should remain an instance of our revised version of (CP). The restriction that
must be imposed, accordingly, has to do only with those -abstracts that contain
nominalized predicates, and the idea is that such -abstracts, in representing
a stratied hierarchy of concepts that can be telescoped downward, must in
principle be interpretable in terms of such a hierarchy. Minimally, this means
that one must be able to assign natural numbers to all of the singular terms
and predicates occurring in such a -abstract in such a way that the number
associated with any predicate occurring as such must be the successor of the
number assigned to its arguments. An additional constraint that must also be
imposed is that the number assigned to any one of the arguments of a rela-
tional predicate must be the same as that assigned to any other such argument.
That is, the -abstract must be interpretable not just in terms of a stratied
hierarchy of concepts but one that is homogeneously stratied as well. This ad-
ditional constraint goes beyond the requirements of Freges original hierarchy,
which given Freges assumption that there are unequal-leveled relational con-
cepts  was heterogeneously stratied. The constraint is necessary, however,
if we are to exclude the -abstract [x9G(R(x;G)^:G(x))] that is involved in
the proof of Cantors theorem and not return in this way back to the original
contradiction. For although this -abstract is not homogeneously stratied, it
is heterogeneously stratied (and therefore is in accord with Freges original
hierarchy).12
Dened formally, we will say that a w¤ or -abstract ' is homogeneously
stratied if, and only if, there is an assignment t of natural numbers to the terms
and predicate expressions occurring in ' (including ' itself if it is a -abstract)
12 It might also be noted in this context that predication, as an unequal-level relation between
objects and the rst-level concepts under which they fall, can be represented in terms or a
heterogeneously stratied -abstract, namely, [xy9G(x = G ^ G(y))], from which Russells
paradox of predication can be derived. This -abstract is not homogeneously stratied and
its exclusion by that criterion su¢ ces to block Russells paradox.
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such that (1) for all terms a and b, if (a = b) occurs in ', them t(a) = t(b);
(2) for all n > 1, all n-place predicate expressions  and all terms a1; :::; an,
if (a1; :::; an) is a w¤ occurring in ', then (i) t(ai) = t(aj) for 1  i; j  n,
and (ii) t() = t(a1) + 1; (3) for all natural numbers m, all individual variables
x1; :::; xm, and all w¤s  , if [x1:::xm ] occurs in ', then (i) t(xi) = t(xj), for
1  i; j  n, and t([x1:::xm ]) = t(x1) + 1; and (4) for all formulas , if []
occurs in ' and a1; :::; ak are all of the terms or predicates occurring in , then
t([])  max[t(a1); :::; t(ak)].
The restriction to be imposed on (CP), accordingly, is that it is to be re-
stricted to -abstracts that are homogeneously stratied. This is to be done
through a grammatical constraint on the w¤s of standard second-order logic
extended so as to allow for the occurrence of nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms. Because the system resulting from this constraint is a second-
order counterpart to the theory of homogeneous simple types (with -abstracts),
we will refer to its as HST*. Thus, an expression is a meaningful w¤ of HST*
if, and only if, it is a w¤ in which every -abstract that occurs is homogeneously
stratied. We call the restriction of (CP) to w¤s that are meaningful in HST*
the homogeneously stratied comprehension principle, or simply (HSCP). The
system HST*, accordingly, is that extension of standard second-order logic
(with identity and -abstracts) in which (1) nominalized predicates are allowed
to occur as (abstract) singular terms on a par with individual variables and
other singular terms  and therefore in which (Plato*) is valid  but in which
(2) the only -abstracts containing nominalized predicates that are allowed are
those that are homogeneously stratied  and therefore in which (3) the com-
prehension principle (CP) is replaced by (HSCP

).
If we were to add quantiable variables that range over second-level concepts
 i.e., variables for variable-binding operators that apply to w¤s and result in
w¤s when so applied  then, an obvious consequence of (HSCP) in such an
extended system would be:
8Q9F (F = [y9G(y = G ^QxG(x))]);
and therefore, by Leibnizs law, (LL*), and (-Conv*),
8Q9F8y(F (y) ! 9G[y = G ^QxG(x)]);
from which, by (Plato*) and (LL*), Freges double-correlation thesis, (Dbl*),
i.e.,
8Q9F8G[QxG(x) ! F (G)]
follows. The provability of the thesis in this way indicates not only the ade-
quacy of its representation in terms of (HSCP), but also the superuousness
of extending the system HST* through the addition of quantiable variables
for variable-binding operators, i.e., for variables that range over second-level
concepts.
Finally, let us observe that the universal concept exists as the most compre-
hensive concept of HST*, i.e., that by (HSCP),
`HST 9F (F = [x(x = x)]);
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and therefore, by (Plato*), the universal class (or intension) exists in HST*
as a concept-correlate; that is, the universal class (or intension) exists as a
legitimate totality of HST*. Yet, because identity, also by (HSCP), stands
for a relation of HST*, it follows by our earlier observation that both Cantors
theorem, (CT), and its variant, (CT2), are refutable in HST*, i.e.,
`HST :(CT) ^ :(CT2).
Our earlier proof of (CT2), and therefore indirectly of (CT) as well, cannot
be given in HST*, on the other hand, because the -abstract needed in the
proof is not available by (HSCP). Indeed, assuming that weak Zermelo set
theory is consistent, no proof of either (CT) or (CT2) is possible in HST*,
because, as has been shown elsewhere, HST* is consistent relative to weak
Zermelo set theory (and it is equiconsistent with the latter, moreover, if (Ext*)
is assumed as well).13
It should be noted, incidentally, that the exclusion of inhomogeneously strat-
ied -abstracts from the meaningful w¤s of HST* does mean that all of the
w¤s of HST* must be homogeneously stratied. In fact, where
V =df [x(x = x)];
we have not only the meaningfulness of V (V ) in HST* but its provability as
well, i.e., `HST V (V ).
5 Homogeneous Stratication and the System
HST
Although Russells paradox is formulable and therefore meaningful in HST*
as an instance of (CP*), i.e., as follows,
9F8x(F (x) ! 9G[x = G ^ :G(x)]);
it is not provable in HST*, and in fact it is refutable by Russells argument.
This is because the only instances of (CP*) that are provable in HST* are those
that are provable on the basis of (HSCP). In other words, we are unable to
derive the above instance of (CP*) in HST* because the -abstract [x9G(x =
G ^ :G(x))] is not homogeneously stratied and therefore not well-formed in
HST*. This means, as far as the system HST* is concerned, that there is
no concept corresponding to this -abstract, which is an acceptable conclusion
in Freges original framework where concepts are assumed to exist (or not to
13See Cocchiarella 1987, ch. 4, section 6. Weak Zermelo set theory is the restriction of
Zermelo set theory to those instances of the Aussonderungsaxiom in which all quantiers in
the comprehension clause are restricted, i.e., of the form (8x 2 y)' or (9x 2 y)'. Weak Z,
incidentally, with or without an axiom of innity, is equiconsistent with the theory of simple
types (with or without an axiom of innity, respectively) as a theory of classes, and so is
HST*+ (Ext*) (with or without an axiom of innity, respectively).
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exist) as unsaturated functions independently of the human capacity for concept
formation.
Such a result is dubious, on the other hand, and in fact it is counter-intuitive,
if by a concept we mean an unsaturated cognitive structure that is part of the
overall human capacity for concept formation. After all, it is one thing to say
that such a concept can have no object as its correlate (be that object an ex-
tension or an intension), but quite another to say that we cannot formulate the
concept itself. It is this situation that is rectied in our second way of modifying
Freges double-correlation thesis. Thus, instead of restricting the correlation of
second- and higher-level concepts with rst-level concepts that is assumed in
Freges original thesis  and excluding thereby the representation of unequal
higher-level concepts  our second way of consistently formulating the picture
presented by the Fregean hierarchy is to modify the correlation of rst-level
concepts with objects. That is, instead of modifying the original comprehen-
sion principle (CP), we can modify (Plato*) so that not every concept need
be assumed to have an object as its correlate. This means that we must allow
singular terms, and certain abstract singular terms in particular, to be deno-
tationless. That is, we must revise the standard logic of singular terms and
rst-order quantiers to one that is free of existential presuppositions. The
details of such a revision (described in section 9) are now well-known, and we
shall assume it in what follows.
In Free logic,the question as to which singular terms, if any, have a deno-
tation, is an issue that is left completely open. Free logic allows in this regard
for the possibility that there may be nothing at all in the universe of discourse
that is a value or the bound individual variables. That means that we can
consistently assume in the revised second-order logic in question what I have
elsewhere called the Abelardìan thesis that although predicates, in their role as
predicates, stand for concepts as (unsaturated) cognitive structures, nominal-
ized predicates, as abstract singular terms, denote nothing:
8F:9x(x = F ): (Abelard*)
Whatever the merits of such a thesis, it is not relevant in a framework in
which we want some, even if not all, nominalized predicates to denote concept-
correlates. In particular, it is not relevant in a framework in which our goal is to
represent the movement downwardof Freges hierarchy, and, in that regard,
to represent at least all of the objects (if not more) that are correlates of the
concepts that can be formulated in HST*. Such a representation is available,
it turns out, and can be given by a rst-order counterpart of the homogeneously
stratied comprehension principle, (HSCP), which is described as follows:
9y(a1 = y) ^ ::: ^ 9y(ak = y)! 9y(y = [x1:::xn']): (9/HSCP)
where (1) y is an individual variable not occurring free in '; (2) [x1:::xn']
is homogeneously stratied; (3) a1; :::; an are all of the variables or nonlogical
constants occurring free in [x1:::xn']; and (4) all bound predicate variables in
' are bound to objects (i.e., for all predicate variables F and w¤s  , if 8F 
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occurs in ', then  is of the form 9z(F = z)! , for some w¤ ). Because of
its connection with the system HST*, we refer to the new system in question
as HST.
In HST, it should be noted, an inhomogeneously stratied -abstract of the
form, [x9G(R(x;G) ^ :G(x))]  and in particular the -abstract [x9G(x =
G)^:G(x))] of Russells paradox  is not only grammatically well-formed, but,
by (CP), is posited as standing, in its role as a predicate, for an unsaturated
concept as well. What Russells argument shows is not that this predicate fails
to stand for a concept but rather that when nominalized it fails to denote an
object. That is, instead of a contradiction, we have both
`HST 9F (F = [x9G(x = G) ^ :G(x))]);
and
`HST :9y(y = [x9G(x = G) ^ :G(x))]):
This means, in particular, that (Plato*) is refutable in HST, i.e.,
9F8x(x 6= F ):
The refutation of (Plato*) indicates that Freges double-correlation thesis is
provable in HST (when the latter is supplemented with bindable variables for
second-level concepts), but only in a restricted form. In particular, given the
following abbreviatory notation for restricted predicate quantiers (where G is
any monadic predicate variable and ' any w¤),
(8G=Obj)' =df 8G(9x(x = G)! ');
(9G=Obj)' =df 9G(9x(x = G) ^ ');
then the restricted form of Freges double-correlation thesis that is provable in
HST can be stated as follows:
8Q9F (8G=Obj)(QxG(x) ! F (G)):
The relationship between the two systems HST* and HST can best be
seen in the following Iemma.14
Lemma: If ' is a meaningful w¤ of HST* in which all predicate quantiers
are restricted as above, y is an individual variable not occurring in ', and
a1; :::; ak are all of the variables or nonlogical constants occurring free in
', then `HST ' only if `HST 9y(a1 = y) ^ ::: ^ 9y(ak = y)! '.
It follows from this lemma that any sentence of HST* in which no nonlog-
ical constants occur and that is bound to objects (i.e., in which all predicate
quantiers are restricted as above) is a theorem of HST* only if it is also a
theorem of HST. But, by (Plato*), every meaningful sentence of HST* is
14See Cocchiarella 1986, ch. 5, § 4, for proof of this lemma.
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provably equivalent in HST* to a sentence that is bound to objects, and there-
fore, in the sense of this equivalence, HST may be said to contain HST*. In
particular, by (9/HSCP), every object that is a correlate of a concept posited
in HST* is also a correlate of a concept posited in HST. Thus, because the
universal concept, V , has a correlate (be it an extension or an intension) in
HST*, then it also has a correlate in HST; and therefore such a correlate
itself falls under the universal concept, i.e.,
`HST V (V ):
Finally, it should also be noted that HST can also be proved consistent
relative to weak Zermelo set theory (or the theory of simple types as a theory
of classes, and it is equiconsistent with both if (Ext*) is assumed as well).15
In regard to the status of Cantors theorem (CT), or its equivalent but more
simply stated alternative, (CT2), let us rst note that the refutation given earlier
Section 2, which depended upon (Plato*), no longer applies. Indeed, if R is the
identity relation, [xv(x = y)], as in that earlier refutation, then there is a
concept F  e.g., the Russellian concept, [x9G(R(x;G)^:G(x))]  such that
8x(F (x)! 9yR(x; y)] and :9xR(x; F ), i.e., :9x(x = F ), are both provable in
HST. Thus, not only are (CT) and (CT2) not refutable in HST

, but in some
of their instances both are provable in HST.
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The fact that (Plato*) is refutable in HST indicates that another version
of Cantors theorem, namely,
8R(8F8G8x[R(x; F ) ^R(x;G) ! (CT3)
8y(F (y)  ! G(y))]! 9F:9xR(x; F ));
which says that no relation that correlates coextensive concepts with the same
object (or, what amounts to the sane idea, that correlates the extensions of
concepts with objects) correlates (the extension of) each concept with some
object, is vacuously provable in HST.
17 This is because in the free logic of
HST only realobjects, i.e., objects that are values of the bound individual
variables, can fall under a concept, including a relational concept. That is,
where y is not free in either a or b,18
`HST 8R[R(a; b)! 9y(a = y) ^ 9y(b = y)];
15See Cocchiarella 1987, ch. 4, §7. The equiconsistency depends upon an axiom of innity
well if such an axiom is assumed to be part of Weak Z or of the theory of simple types.
16For the proof of an instance of (CT) in HST, we need only let R be the identity rela-
tion and F be the universal concept, [x(x = x)]. We then observe that 8x8G(R(x;G) !
[F (x) ! G v F ]) is provable and that there is a concept G  e.g., [x9G(Rx;G)^:G(x))]
 such that G v F and :9xR(x;G), i.e.,:9x(x = G), are both provable in HST.
17This version of Cantors theorem, or rather a statement essentially equivalent to (CT3),
was rst suggested to me by Stewart Shapiro.
18This result follows from [xyR(x; y)] = R, which is an instance of (id), and the free logic
version of (-Conv*), namely,
[x1:::xn'](a1; :::; an) ! 9x1:::9xn(a1 = x1) ^ ::: ^ 9xn(an = xn) ^ ');
where no xi is free in any aj , for all i; j such that 1  i; j  n.
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and therefore, given the refutation of (Plato*),
`HST 8R9F:9xRx; F );
from which follows the vacuous provability of (CT3) in HST. Of course, in
HST, where (Plato*) is valid, (CT3) is not provable but refutable by taking R
to be the identity relation.
There are stronger forms of Cantors theorem, (CT), and it variants, (CT2)
and (CT3), that are refutable in HST however. These versions depend upon
the existential predicate quantiers in the consequents of (CT), (CT2), and
(CT3) being restricted in the manner indicated above. Thus, where
8R(R is many-one ! 8F [8F8G(R(x;G)! (F (x) ! (9/CT)
G v F )]! :(9G=Obj)[G v F ^ :9xR(x;G)]);
8R(R is many-one ! (9F=Obj)[8x(F (x)! (9/CT2)
9yRx; y)) ^ :9xR(x; F )]);
8R(8F8G8x[R(x; F ) ^R(x;G) ! 8y(F (y) ! G(y))] (9/CT3)
! (9F=Obj):9xR(x; F ));
then it is easily seen that each of these forms of Cantors theorem is refutable
in HST. That is,
`HST :(9=CT) ^ :(9=CT2) ^ :(9=CT3).
(In the refutation of each of these forms of Cantors theorem we need only take
R to be the identity relation, i.e., [xy(x = y)], and observe that by denition
(8F=Obj)9xR(x; F ), i.e., (8F=Obj)9x(F = x), is trivially provable in HST.19
Each of these refutable forms of Cantors theorem is stronger than its coun-
terpart in HST, because each implies but is not equivalent to its counterpart.
Of course, in HST* where (Plato*) is provable, each form is equivalent to its
counterpart  but then, each of the counterparts is refutable in HST*. The
counterparts are not refutable in HST, to be sure, but that is only because they
have instances that are vacuously provable, which can hardly lend any substan-
tive support to Cantors theorem in such a framework. The proper content of
19Given that R is the identity relation, then for the refutation of (9/CT2) and(9/CT3) in
HST, we have it that not only is (8F=Obj)9xR(x; F ) provable but so are 8F8x[F (x) !9yR(x; y)] and, by Leibnizs law, (LL*),
8F8G8x(R(x; F ) ^R(x;G)! 8y[F (y) ! G(y)]);
For the refutation or (9/CT), let F be the universal concept, [x(x = x)], and observe
that because (8G=Obj)9xR(x;G) is provable, where R is the identity relation, then so is
(8G=Obj)[G v F ! 9xR(x;G)].
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Cantors theorem and its variants, in other words, is really that given by the
stronger forms (which, as noted, are not really stronger in HST). In any case,
it is in the sense of these stronger forms that we maintain that Cantors theorem
is refutable in a logical framework that is based upon Freges double-correlation
thesis. The consistency of these frameworks shows that its not our logical intu-
itions (including in particular the logical notion of a class as the extension of a
concept) that must be given up, but, assuming that we adopt either HST* or
HST as our logical framework, Cantors power-set theorem instead.
6 Identity and the system T*
The conict between Cantors theorem and our logical intuitions, especially
those regarding the existence of the universal class (or intension), is not ab-
solute, it turns out, but can be resolved by turning to a di¤erent view of iden-
tity; namely, one according to which identity, as a logical, syncategorematic
constant, stands for a transcendental(or cross-categorial) notion that applies
to concepts as well as to objects, and therefore a notion that is not itself a
relation (between objects). The assumption that identity stands for a relation,
i.e., that as an instance of the comprehension principle (CP), we have
9R(R = [y(y = y)]);
was an essential step in the refutation of Cantors theorem given in section 2. If
we drop this assumption by excluding as well-formed all -abstracts in which the
identity sign occurs, then it turns out that the refutation of Cantors theorem
fails, and therefore that Russells paradox fails as well. The system that results
from standard second-order logic with -abstracts and nominalized predicates
as abstract singular terms by excluding those -abstracts in which the identity
sign occurs we call T*. We refer to the restricted version of ((CP) that holds
in T* as (CP ).
Russells paradox, as an instance of (CP*), i.e., the Russellian concept spec-
ied as follows,
9F8x(F (x) ! 9G[x = G ^ :G(x)]);
is not derivable in T*, though it is well-formed. The only instances of (CP*)
that are derivable in T* are those that can be derived from (CP ), i.e., those
in which the identity sign does not occur. Of course, instead of identity we can
turn to indiscernibility, which, for convenience, we will abbreviate as follows
(where a, b are arbitrary terms, simple or complex, and F is a monadic predicate
variable new to a and b),
a  b =df 8F [F (a) ! F (b)]:
In other words, even if identity is not a relation, indiscernibility is, and therefore,
by (CP ), we have
`T 9R(R = [x9G(x  G ^ :G(x))]);
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from which, by (LL*) and elementary transformations, we have the modied
Russell concept specied as follows:
`T 9F8x(F (x) ! 9G[x  G ^ :G(x)]):
This last result does not lead to Russells paradox, however. That is, no
contradiction based on this w¤ is forthcoming  nor can a contradiction be
constructed in T* in any other way. The system T* is consistent, in other
words, and it can be proved consistent relative to standard second-order logic
with identity and -abstracts.20
The attempt to derive Russells paradox from the above result does show
by (Plato*) that the modied Russellian concept in question applies to itself,
or, strictly speaking, that the correlate of any concept coextensive with the
modied Russell concept falls under that concept:
`T 8x(F (x) ! 9G[x  G ^ :G(x)])!F (F ):
It does not show, however, that the correlate of any such concept also does
not fall under that concept, which would be the contradiction one might ex-
pect. Rather, what follows instead is that the correlate of such a concept is
indiscernible from the correlate of a concept under which it does not fall, and
therefore that
`T 9F9G[F  G ^ F (F ) ^ :G(F )]:
From this it follows by (Plato*) that there are non-coextensive concepts in T*
whose correlates are indiscernible:
`T 9F9G(F  G ^ :8y[F (y) ! G(y)]):
This last result is not as odd as it seems, because what it really amounts to
is an instance of Cantors theorem in the form (CT3). To see this, let us rst
note that by instantiating (CT3) to the indiscernibility relation, we have
8F8G8x(x  F ^ x  G! 8y[F (y) ! G(y)]! 9F:9x(x  F ):
But, by (Plato*) and the fact that identity implies indiscernibility,
`T :8F:(x  F );
and therefore, assuming that (CT3) is valid T*, we have
`T 9F9G9x(x  F ^ x  G ^ :8y[F (y) ! G(y)]);
which, because indiscernibility is an equivalence relation (and in fact the strongest
equivalence relation in T*), reduces to the above thesis that there are non-
coextensive concepts in T* whose correlates are indiscernible.
20See Cocchiarella 1986, ch. 4, section 6. The proof of consistency given is for T*, which is
T* without -abstracts, but it can easily be extended to deal with -abstracts as well.
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The above result is not odd, we maintain, not only because it is an instance of
(CT3), but because (CT3) itself  and Cantors theorem, (CT), and it variant,
(CT2) as well  is provable in T*. Thus, by way of an informal sketch of a
proof of (CT3), let R be any relation for which the antecedent of (CT3) is true
and its consequent false, i.e., for which 8F9xR(x; F ) is true as well. Then, where
F is the concept that [x9G(R(x;G)^:G(x))] stands for  which, by (CP ),
we know exists in T*  it follows by the reductio assumption that R(x; F ) is
true of some object as a value of x. But, for any such object, F (x) must be true;
for if F (x) were false, then, by (-Conv*), 8G[R(x:G)! G(x)] would be true,
and therefore, by universally instantiating G to F , F (x) would be true after all.
But then, because F (x) is true, it follows by (-Conv*) that [R(x;G) ^ :G(x)]
must also be true of some concept G, and therefore, by assumption of the
antecedent of (CT3), 8y[F (y) ! G(y)] must also true. This last is impossible,
however, because F (x) is true, and therefore G(x) is true as well, whereas we
already have it that :G(x) is true. Thus, the assumption that there is a relation
for which the antecedent of (CT3) is true and its consequent false leads in T*
to an impossible situation, which shows that (CT3) is provable in T*.
Our earlier proof in section 2 of (CT2) is easily seen to apply in T*, and,
as noted there, a similar proof applies to Cantors theorem, (CT), as well. In
addition, because (Plato*) is provable in T*, it follows that all of the stronger
forms, (9/CT), (9/CT2), and (9/CT3) of Cantors theorem are also provable
inT* (because they are not really stronger than their counterparts in T* after
all but rather are equivalent to them). Thus, in T*  unlike the situation in
either HST* or HST  all forms of Cantors theorem are provable, i.e.,
`T (CT) ^ (CT2) ^ (CT3).
Now Freges double-correlation thesis, (Dbl*), we have argued, means that
Cantors theorem must be rejected. It is natural to expect, accordingly, that if
Cantors theorem is not rejected, but in fact provable in all of its forms, then
Freges double-correlation thesis must be rejected instead. Freges thesis must
be refutable in T*, in other words, when T* is supplemented with variables
and a quantier logic for second-level concepts. For, if Freges thesis were to
hold, then concepts whose correlates (be they extensions or intensions) are in-
discernible with respect to rst-level concepts would themselves be indiscernible
with respect to second-level concepts, i.e., then
8Q9F8G[QxG(x)  ! F (G)] `T 8F8G(F  G ! 8Q[(QxF (x)  !
QxG(x)])
would be true.
But in a quantier logic for second- as well as rst-level concepts, rst-
level concepts that are indiscernible with respect to second-level concepts are
coextensive, i.e.,
8Q[QxF (x) ! G(x)]! 8y[F (v) ! G(y)]
is provable in such a logic.21 Therefore, Freges double-correlation thesis has the
21Briey, the argument for this is that by universal instantiation and tautologous transfor-
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consequence that concepts whose correlates are indiscernible are coextensive,
i.e.,
89F8G[QxG(x) ! F (G)] `T 8F8G(F  G! 8y[F (y) ! G(y)]:
But, as noted above it is just this consequence that is refuted by (CT3); and
(CT3), as already noted, is provable in T*. Thus, when T* is supplemented
with a logic for second-level concepts, we have a refutation of (Dbl*), i.e.,
`T :8Q9F8G[QxG(x) ! F (G)]:
This last result is appropriate for T*, it should be emphasized, because
the refutation in this system of the thesis that concepts whose correlates are
indiscernible are themselves coextensive amounts to a rejection of the logical
picture implicit in Freges hierarchy  namely, that higher-level concepts are
as much involved in the determination of lower-level concepts as the latter are
in the determination of the former, which means that concepts whose correlates
are indiscernible should themselves be (at least) coextensive. Thus, in a system
where the latter thesis is rejected on the basis of Cantors theorem, it is natural
to expect that Freges thesis will also be rejected.
Note that because of the occurrence of the identity sign in the -abstract
[y9G(y = G^QxG(x))], the proof we gave for Freges double-correlation thesis
in HST* does not apply in T*. The replacement of the identity sign in this
-abstract by the sign for the indiscernibility relation does not result in Freges
thesis, moreover, but in something much weaker (and consistent)  just as
replacing identity by indiscernibility in the formulation for Russells paradox
results in something much weaker (and consistent), namely, an application of
Cantors theorem in the form (CT3). This shows how di¤erent identity is from
indiscernibility, because what it says is that not all concepts whose correlates
are indiscernible are coextensive, whereas identity, as a transcendental (or
cross-categorial) notion regarding concepts as well as objects, requires identical
concepts to be coextensive. Thus, what follows in T* is that di¤erent concepts
can have indiscernible objects as their correlates, i.e.,
`T 9F9G[F 6= G ^ F  G]:
From this it follows that in T* indiscernibility is not a many-one relation and
that identity does not, indeed cannot, stand for a relation, i.e.,
`T :9R8x8y[R(x; y) ! x = y]:
mations,
8G[QxG(x) ! G(y)]! ([QxF (x) ! QxG(x)]! [F (y) ! G(y)])
is valid, and therefore, by universal generalization and elementary quantier laws, so is
8y9Q8G[QxG(x) ! G(y)]! (8Q[QxF (x) ! QxG(x)]! 8y[F (y) ! G(y)]):
But, by the comprehension principle for second-level concepts,
8y9Q8G[QxG(x) ! G(y)]
is valid, and therefore so is the consequent that rst-level concepts are coextensive if they are
indiscernible with respect to second-level concepts.
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Because the identity sign does not stand for a relation in T*, the universal
class (or intension), V , as dened earlier, namely, as [x(x = x)] is no longer
available. Instead we must turn to a weaker version dened in terms of indis-
cernibility:
U =df [x(x  x)]:
This version is distinctively weaker in T* than the original in that, together
with Cantors theorem, it does not yield Cantors paradox. Indiscernibility, in
falling short of identity, does not itself amount to a many-one relation, and
in that regard it cannot be used to correlate each object in (or falling under)
U with a subclass of U (e.g., its singleton) in order to show that there
are cardinally fewer objects falling under It than there are subclasses of U .
Identity, were it allowed to occur in -abstracts, could be used to dene such
a correlation  namely as the many-one relation that [xy(y = [z(z  x)])]
would then stand for  but such a specication is not possible in T*. Thus,
T* provides an example of a system in which, though Cantors theorem is
provable, Cantors paradox is not.
7 Identity and the system T
One way in which identity can be allowed to occur in -abstracts and thereby
represent a (many-one) relation is to modify T* the way we modied HST*
to obtain HST  namely, by allowing all -abstracts to be well-formed, includ-
ing those in which the identity sign occurs, but then avoid Russells paradox
by dropping the requirement that all nominalized predicates must denote as
abstract singular terms. Thus, as in the case of the system HST, instead of
modifying the original comprehension principle (CP), we can instead modify
the thesis (Plato*) that every concept must have a concept-correlate (be it an
extension or an intension).
Instead of (Plato*) we follow the strategy adopted in the development of
the system HST and assume a rst-order counterpart of the restricted compre-
hension principle (CP). That is, in analogy with (9/HSCP), the rst-order
counterpart of the comprehension principle (CP), we assume the following as
a rst-order counterpart to (CP):
9y(a1 = y) ^ ::: ^ 9y(ak = y)! 9y(y = [x1:::xn']); (9/CP )
where (1) y is an individual variable not occurring free in ', (2) ' is an identity-
free w¤, (3) a1; :::; ak are all of the variables or nonlogical constants occurring
free [x1:::xn'], and (4) all bound predicate variables in ' are bound to objects
(i.e., 8F occurs in ', then  is of the form 9z(F = z) ! , for some w¤
. Again, because of its connection with the system T*, we refer to the new
system in question as T.
By the unqualied comprehension principle (CP), it is provable in T

 that
there is such a relational concept as identity, i.e.,
`T 9R(R = [xy(x = y)]);
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but it is not provable in T that this concept has an extension (or intension),
i.e., that it has a concept-correlate. In fact, it is provable in T that it cannot
have any correlate at all, i.e.,
`T :9z(z = [xy(x = y)]):
For if there were such a correlate, then, by (9/CP ),
9y(y = [x(9G=Obj)(x = G ^ :G(x))])
would be true, from which Russells paradox would follow, and T unlike T*,
would then be inconsistent. But just as HST can be shown to be consistent
relative to HST*, T can be shown to be consistent relative to T*, which
means that no contradiction is forthcoming in T at all.
Cantors theorem (CT) and its variant (CT2) are provable in by essentially
the same argument that shows their provability in T*. (CT3) is provable as
well, but only vacuously, because the consequent of (CT3), namely, 9F:R(x; F ),
is already provable in T for those concepts (such as the Russellian concept
described above) that have no object as a concept-correlate.
The stronger version of (CT3), namely, (9/CT3), is not provable in T unless
the many-one relation in question is also assumed to have a concept-correlate
 and the same observation applies to the stronger versions of (CT) and (CT2)
as well. But, as already noted, the identity relation  which is the relation that
is needed for the derivation of Cantors paradox  does not have a concept-
correlate (be it an extension or an intension) in T, and for that reason Cantors
paradox is not derivable in T. Thus even when T* is modied to allow for
identity as a relational concept, i.e., when T* is replaced by T, we are still
unable to derive Cantors paradox. For even though every concept is related
to itself by the relation of identity  where identity is a transcendental notion
applying in di¤erent categories  not every concept has an extension (or in-
tension), and therefore not every concept has a concept-correlate that is also
related to itself by the relation of identity. In this way the proof of Cantors
theorem, or of any of it variants, as it applies to concepts does not carry over to
objects as well, and it is for that reason that we are unable to derive Cantors
paradox in T.
8 Appendix A: Standard Second-Order Logic with
Nominalized Predicates and the systems HST*
and T*
We shall identify the di¤erent types of meaningful expressions by associating
them with di¤erent natural numbers We take 0 to represent the type of all
singular terms, 1 the type of all well-formed formulas (w¤s), by which we mean
the di¤erent forms of assertions, and n+1, for n > 0, to represent the type of all
n-place predicate expressions. We assume a denumerable innity of individual
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variables and for each natural number n, a denumerable innity of n-place
predicate variables. (Propositional variables arc identied with 0-place predicate
variables). We use x, y, z, with or without numerical subscripts, to refer
(in the metalanguage) to individual variables, and Fn, Gn, Rnto refer to
replace predicate variables. (We usually drop the superscript when the context
makes clear the degree of a predicate variable, and we use Rto only refer to
relational variables). We take !, :, =, 8, and  as primitive logical constants,
and we assume that other logical constants (e.g., ^, !, 9) to be dened in the
usual way (as abbreviations in the metalanguage). For each natural number n
we recursively dene the meaningful expressions of type n, in symbols, MEn, as
follows:
1. every individual variable or constant is in ME0, and every n-place predi-
cate variable or constant is in both MEn+1 and ME0;
2. if a; b 2 ME0, then (a = b) 2 ME1;
3. if  2 MEn+1, and a1; an, 2 ME0, then (a1; :::; an) 2 ME1;
4. if ' 2 ME1, and x1; :::; xn, are pairwise distinct individual variables, then
[x1:::xn'] 2 MEn+1;
5. if ' 2 ME1, then :' 2 ME1;
6. if '; 2 ME1, then ('!  ) 2 ME1;
7. if ' 2 ME1, and a is an individual or a predicate variable, then 8a' 2
ME1;
8. if ' 2 ME1, then ['] 2 ME0; and
9. if n > 1, then MEn 2 ME0.
By a singular term we mean any member of ME0, and by an n-place pred-
icate expression we mean any member of MEn+1. We take the w¤s to be the
members of ME1. Although, by clause (9), every predicate expression is nomi-
nalizable into a singular term, not every w¤ is a term. We di¤er in this regard
from what Frege would allow, but the di¤erence is unimportant because, by
clause (4), ['] is a w¤ (where n is 0), and, by clause (8), ['] is a singular
term. (We read ['] as that 'when it occurs as a singular term.)
The extension of standard second-order logic to w¤s as dened above, i.e.,
to w¤s that may contain nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms, can
be axiomatically described as follows. We use a *to indicate that the axiom
applies to w¤s with or without nominalized predicates, and we assume bondage
and freedom and proper substitution to be dened in the usual way. We also
assume modus ponens and universal generalization of individual and predicate
variables to be primitive rules of inference.
(A0*) All tautologous w¤s.
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(A1*) 8u('!  ); where u is an individual or predicate variable.
(A2*) '! 8u'; where u is an individual or predicate variable not occur-
ring free in '.
(A3*) 9x(a = x), where a is a singular term in which x has no free occur-
rences.
(LL*) (a = b) ! ('  !  ); where a; b are singular terms, '; are w¤s,
and  comes from ' by replacing one or more free occurrences of b by free
occurrences of a.22
(-Conv*) [x1; :::; xn'](a1; :::; an) ! '(a1=x1; :::; an=xn), where a1; :::; an
are singular terms and each ai is free for xi in ':
(ID) [x1; :::; xnR(x1; :::; xn)] = R; where R is an n-place predicate vari-
able or constant.
(Rw*) [x1; :::; xn'] = [y1; :::; yn'(y1=x1; :::; yn=xn)]; where no yi occurs
in '.
(CP) 9Fn(F = [x1; :::; xn']), where F does not occur free in '.
As explained in section 2, this extension of standard second-order logic leads
to both Cantors theorem and its negation, i.e., to a contradiction. This con-
tradiction is avoided in the systems HST* and T* by placing a restriction
on which -abstract are allowed to be meaningful. i.e. well-formed. Thus, as
indicated in section 4, a w¤ is a meaningful w¤ of HST* if, and only if, every
-abstract that occurs in that w¤ is homogeneously stratied (where homoge-
neous stratication is as dened in section 4); and a w¤ is a meaningful w¤ of
T*, if, and only if, the identity sign does not occur in any -abstract occurring
in that w¤. These restrictions amount of modifying the comprehension principle
(CP), replacing it in HST* by the homogeneously stratied comprehension
principle (HSCP), and by the comprehension principle (CP

 ) in T*.
9 Appendix B: the Systems HST, and T


Instead of placing any restrictions on w¤s and modifying (CP), the systems
HST and T

 (as described in sections 5 and 7, respectively) avoid the contra-
diction by rejecting the assumption that every concept has a concept-correlate.
This is done by replacing (A3*) and (-Conv*) by their free logic counter-
parts.
(A3**) 8x9y(x = y).
(9/-Conv*) [x1; :::; xn'](a1; :::; an) ! 9x1:::9xn(a1 = xn ^ :::^ an = xn ^
'); where no xi is free in any aj , for 1  i; j  n.
22See footnote 5 for a description of how (LL*) applies to nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms.
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and adding the law of identity (a = a) for all singular terms a, which without
(A3*) is no longer derivable.
With these changes the principle of universal instantiation of a singular term
for an individual variable, (UI1), is no longer derivable (the way it is in HST*
and T* except in the following qualied form:
9y(a = y)! [8x'! '(a=x)]: (9/UI1)
where a is any singular term that is free for x in ' and in which y has no free oc-
currences. Without (A3*), the thesis that every concept has a concept-correlate,
(Plato*), is no longer derivable. In place of (Plato*), HST has (9/HSCP)
(as described in section 5) as the rst-order counterpart of the restricted com-
prehension principle (HSCP), and T

 has (9/CP ) (as described in section 7)
as the rst-order counterpart of the restricted comprehension principle (CP ).
Otherwise, both HST and T

 have the original unrestricted comprehension
principle (CP) for concepts in general.
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